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This paper investigates the degree of involuntariness in the entrepreneurial activity of 
the dependent solo self-employed, as well as the effect of the country's wealth and labor 
market institutions. Using the unique information available in the 2017 European Labor 
Force Survey (EU-LFS) for 25 countries, we can properly identify the dependent solo 
self-employed and analyze to what extent they behave in accordance with an 
occupational choice model when making their self-employment decision. For that, we 
account for the reasons why they enter into self-employment (voluntarily or 
involuntarily either out of necessity or requested by the former employer). The results 
indicate that involuntary self-employment, mostly due to being required by previous 
employer, significantly increases the probability of being dependent solo versus non-
dependent self-employed. The wealthiest countries have a lower incidence of this group 
of workers, mainly if they are involuntary self-employed. Moreover, labor market 
institutions that decrease the flexibility of paid employment tend to increase the 
incidence of dependent solo self-employment. These results point to this group of 
workers being particularly vulnerable with the degree of vulnerability significantly 
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Political and academic interest in self-employment has increased over the years because it is 
considered an important source of new jobs and an alternative to paid employment. However, it is well 
known that the self-employed make up a heterogeneous group of workers with some of them being in a 
“grey area” between wage-employment and a proper entrepreneurial activity. In particular, in recent years 
there has been a shift towards greater outsourcing, which has led to an increase in the number of workers 
defined as “false” self-employed. The main reason behind this phenomenon is it is less costly for 
employers to hire self-employed workers than to hire employees.  
The emergence of this type of employment activity has generated a great deal of interest because of 
its potential impact on traditional labor market relations and because it creates a strong demand for social 
protection (Perulli, 2003; Thörnquist, 2015). Consequently, many governments have introduced policies 
for its regulation (Eichhorst et al. 2013; Eurofound, 2017). Thus, it seems relevant to study these self-
employed separately because we can expect their motivations, characteristics and the effect of the 
macroeconomic conditions and labor market institutions to differ from the self-employed who are 
considered entrepreneurial in nature. 
Different definitions have been used in the literature to discuss and deliberate this issue. For instance, 
Vries et al. (2020) focus on the solo self-employed (those self-employed without employees) as a 
particularly vulnerable group. Nevertheless, in our view the self-employed that depend economically on a 
single client (who in many cases is the former employer) are subject to greater income uncertainty and 
vulnerability. Typically, these self-employed behave similarly to employees with respect to their lack of 
capacity for making business decisions, but have a more precarious situation in terms of the benefits that 
the employees enjoy. We recognize that even within the economically dependent self-employed there is a 
great deal of heterogeneity. In particular, many of them do not have the capacity to create jobs for others. 
Thus, we investigate the subset of “dependent solo self-employed” (hereafter DSSE) who probably are 
the group that is most similar to employees but who have a lesser degree of labor protection and a higher 
degree of income insecurity.   
From a theoretical perspective, as Boeri et al (2020) point out, self-employment is typically treated as 
a labor supply decision -voluntary sorting by individuals- and it does not incorporate demand-driven 
determinants. However, it is precisely these factors that could be crucial for the dependent solo self-
employed. Compared to other self-employed that may enter into this activity searching for flexibility, the 
DSSE would prefer to have regular employment and only become self-employed to avoid unemployment 
or because they have been forced to do so by their employers. Thus, we analyze to what extent the DSSE 
behave in accordance with an occupational choice model when making their self-employment decision. 
We take advantage of the unique information available in the 2017 European Labor Force Survey 
(EU-LFS) ad-hoc module on self-employed workers for 25 countries. It allows us to properly define the 
DSSE as those self-employed without employees who worked for only one client who decides about 
his/her working hours, and to account for the reasons why they start an entrepreneurial activity. In 
particular, workers describe themselves as involuntarily involved in self-employment (either out of 
necessity or requested by the previous employer) or as voluntary self-employed, who actively choose to 
become entrepreneurs to exploit business opportunities.   
There are significant differences in the prevalence of DSSE between countries, and it is well known 
that macroeconomic conditions and institutions also matter for entrepreneurial activity. By exploiting the 
cross-country variation in our sample, we also study the effect of the country's wealth and labor market 
institutions on the incidence of the DSSE. The literature typically comes up with a list of institutional 
variables that may explain entrepreneurial differences between countries (Centeno, 2000; Dilli et al. 2018; 
Malchow-Møller et al. 2010; Torrini, 2005). In this paper, we focus on the effect of the GDP per capita as 




institutions in terms of regulation of permanent employment: the temporary employment rate, the 
employers´ social security contributions as a percentage of total labor costs, the degree of centralization in 
wage bargaining and the share of public sector. If the DSSE are affected differently than non-dependent 
self-employed by these variables, and if their effect changes depending on the degree of involuntariness 
in the decision, this should be taken into account when designing specific policies to protect them or to 
improve their labor market outcomes. 
Our results indicate that the DSSE are a particularly vulnerable group because they are more likely to 
enter into this activity due to involuntary reasons and, therefore, less likely to respond to the typical 
occupational choice model. They are also more likely to be negatively affected by a country's wealth, 
particularly if they are involuntary self-employed being forced to do so by the former employer. 
Moreover, our results confirm that employers tend to substitute regular employees with dependent solo 
self-employed when they face labor market institutions that increase the protection of the paid employed. 
Nonetheless, at sample magnitudes, these effects are significantly smaller than that of GDP per capita. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some theoretical predictions about the effect 
of involuntariness as a push factor to become dependent solo self-employed and about the effect of the 
macroeconomic and institutional environment. Section 3 presents the EU-LFS database and provides 
some descriptive evidence. The econometric specification and estimation method are described in Section 
4, and Section 5 summarizes the main findings. Section 6 states the conclusions.  
2. Literature review and main hypotheses 
As we will show, the incidence of DSSE is fairly heterogeneous across European countries and 
deserves careful analysis. Until recently, most cross-country labor market empirical analyses have 
focused on overall self-employment while research on dependent or solo self-employment has been 
mostly conducted at a country level or for a small group of countries.  We structure this section around 
two working hypotheses we want to analyze empirically. First, involuntariness as a push factor to became 
DSSE versus non-dependent self-employed and, second, the impact of a country’s wealth and different 
labor market institutions across countries.   
2.1. DSSE as an involuntary choice 
Our first hypothesis deals with involuntariness as a push factor to became dependent solo self-
employed. Motivations for working as self-employed may involve time flexibility or autonomy. While 
from the employer’s perspective, the motives for choosing self-employed workers may involve partial 
transfer of entrepreneurial risk, the circumvention of labor and social security law, as well as regulations 
from collective bargaining (Eichhorst et al. 2013).  
Most of the theoretical literature on self-employment use a model of occupational choice as a starting 
point (see for example Evans and Leighton, 1989, and Rees and Shah, 1986). Individuals who have found 
a business opportunity decide voluntarily whether to follow it or not. What they choose depends upon a 
comparison of the utility they expect to receive in the alternative occupations, including factors such as 
more autonomy in organizing their time or the benefits of being their own boss (Hurst and Pugsley, 
2011). However, while this could be an appropriate starting point for explaining the self-employment 
decision for non-dependent self-employed, there could be reasons for which an important proportion of 
the dependent solo self-employed do not make any choice. Therefore, treating this type of self-
employment as a choice does not allow for demand-driven determinants that are probably crucial for them 
(Boeri et al., 2020).     
Empirical literature on the dependent self-employed mostly focuses on their role to allow employers 
to reduce labor costs and to evade employment protection legislation looking for flexibility. Nevertheless, 
one of the shortcomings of these papers is that, due to data limitations, it is not possible to account for the 
reasons behind the self-employment decision and, therefore, the degree of occupational choice. Moreover, 
different papers use different definitions of dependent self-employed. For instance, Böheim and 




for the dependent self-employed similar to ours,1 but they do not account explicitly for the reasons why 
they start the self-employment activity but only whether the main reason for entering or leaving 
dependent self-employment is due to changes in customer numbers. Román et al. (2011) associate 
dependent self-employed to those switching to self-employment that declare having started working with 
the same employer or business while they were employees, and Kautonen et al. (2009) adopts the notion 
of involuntary self-employed but lacks the notion of dependency. 
 
Another strand of the literature focuses on the comparison between the dependent self-employed with 
the non-dependent ones or the paid-employed in terms of some job market outcomes. For instance, Millán 
et al. (2020) using data from the European Working Conditions Survey (2010) study whether job control, 
job demands and job outcomes of dependent self-employed workers are more similar to those of the self-
employed or paid employed. They consider as dependent self-employed those self-employed without 
employees who respond negatively to at least 2 of these 3 questions: (i) whether her firm generally has 
more than one client, (ii) whether she can hire employees and (iii) whether she makes the most important 
decisions on how to run the business. Therefore, they include in their definition both economically and 
personally dependent self-employed.  
In this paper, we only focus on the economically dependent solo self-employed and on the reasons 
why they become self-employed, not on their job market outcomes. The data set we use homogeneously 
identifies them for all European countries and it is the first data set that offers information about the 
degree of occupational choice when facing the self-employment decision. Therefore, we can account 
simultaneously for the phenomenon of dependency and involuntariness. Moreover, it also contains a 
battery of questions that allow us to study the degree of job satisfaction of this group of self-employed 
workers. 
2.2. Country's wealth, labor market institutions and the incidence of DSSE 
Our second set of hypothesis has to do with the impact of economic conditions and the institutional 
framework on DSSE differences across countries. As to the former, Torrini (2005) or Centeno (2000), 
taking per capita GDP as a proxy for capital per worker, finds that the richest countries typically have a 
lower incidence of overall self-employment, while Baumann et al. (2012) find a negative although non-
significant relationship between the per capita GDP level and self-employment rate. In this paper, we 
analyze to what extent a rise in the level of GDP per capita is associated with a decline in the returns to 
DSSE versus non-dependent self-employment and whether this effect changes depending on the degree of 
involuntariness.  
 
The literature has also focused on the relationship between the strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL, generally measured using the OECD cross-country ranking) and the incidence of overall 
self-employment. Employers may try to circumvent high firing and hiring costs by contracting-out self-
employed workers. However, the available evidence is not conclusive. Some studies (Grubb and Wells, 
1993; OECD, 1999 and Centeno, 2000) report a positive relationship, while more recent research 
(Robson, 2003, Baumann et al. 2012 and Torrini, 2005) finds less robust evidence for a positive 
relationship. Roman et al. (2011) detected a positive impact of EPL on transitions to dependent self-
employment and the opposite effect for independent self-employment. 
 
Nonetheless, the EPL may be an insufficient indicator to show the consequences of labor rigidity in 
segmented labor markets. Several countries have passed labor reforms aimed at reducing the gap between 
highly protected workers on regular contracts and poorly protected workers on temporary contracts, but 
many of them have not achieved their purpose: the use of fixed-term contracts has persisted as the main 
source of external flexibility. Thus, EPL indicators are useful for showing the differences in national labor 
                                                             
1 The BLFS defined dependent self-employed as self-employed workers who have no employees and only one 
customer, while according to our definition based on Eurostat (2018) DSSE are those self-employed without 




market legislation across time, but they may be insufficient for reflecting the actual role of fixed term 
contracts as mechanisms of workforce adjustment in a firm's personnel policy. Moreover, as the OECD 
(2020) recognizes, the coverage of enforcement issues in the OECD indicators remains limited overall, as 
they do not take into account certain aspects of the functioning of the judicial system, such as access to 
labor courts or the length of proceedings. Boeri and Jimeno (2005) also point out that there would be 
interactions between the EPL and other institutional features as well as measurement errors2 that question 
the validity of many findings using the EPL. Therefore, in this paper we have chosen to include, as a 
more appropriate indicator of labor market flexibility, the rate of temporary employment.3 
 
Moreover, the relationship between labor market rigidity and the share of DSSE versus non-
dependent self-employment might be sensitive to the inclusion of other institutional variables. In this 
paper, we consider the share of workers in the public sector, social security contributions paid by the 
employers and the degree of centralization of collective bargaining agreements as other measures related 
to the regulation of the labor market. Torrini (2005) examines the role of the public sector in crowding-
out overall self-employment, finding a negative relationship between both variables. As for taxation, 
some studies found a positive relationship between taxation and self-employment (Eichhorst et al. 2013; 
Muehlberger and Bertolini 2008; Román et al. 2011) on the ground that self-employed workers would 
have greater opportunities to hide their income from the tax authorities. However, other authors have 
challenged this view arguing that taxation could discourage entrepreneurial activities (Fölster 2002; Davis 
et al. 1999). Torrini (2005) finds that taxation can either spur or reduce the self-employment rate 
depending on the country’s attitude towards tax evasion. In this paper, we study the effect of the social 
security contributions paid by the employers to their employees as a percentage of total labor costs.  
Finally, contracting out self-employed workers has also become a way of circumventing the rules 
imposed by collective agreements. In addition, more centralized wage structure may also affect the 
worker’s incentives to become self-employed, as a way of evading the institutionalized compression 
(Malchow-Møller et al.2010).  
 
In sum, previous empirical evidence offers mixed evidence about the differences between countries 
in the use of self-employed workers and, in particular, of new and more precarious forms of self-
employment (dependent and solo) and about the role that labor market institutions can play in these 
differences. In this paper, we conduct an analysis for a large group of European countries, which allows 
us to analyze the effect of the institutional setting on increasing/decreasing the incidence of DSSE versus 
non-dependent self-employment as well as the effect of variables at an individual level focusing on the 
degree of involuntariness that this type of occupation entails. 
3. Data description 
 
3.1. The data set 
The data set comes from the 2017 EU-LFS ad-hoc module on self-employed workers coordinated by 
Eurostat, which conducts this survey in the 28 Member States of the European Union and three EFTA 
countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). A key advantage of the 2017 module is that it provides 
specific information about self-employment not usually available in other data sets regarding the reasons 
why individuals work as self-employed. This information can be complemented with the annual 
information traditionally offered by EULFS on personal and job characteristics. This paper explores two 
of the three sub-modules available in this sample: sub-module one related to the economically dependent 
self-employed, and sub-module two related to working conditions for the self-employed and, more 
specifically, the main reasons for becoming self-employed.   
                                                             
2 Measurement errors arise because there is within-country variation in the actual enforcement of regulations, which 
is not captured by cross-country analyses. 
3 Casey (1988) points out that temporary employment is generally accepted as an important component of a 




The cross-sectional sample used in this paper collects information on self-employed with or without 
employees (non-family workers) and employees aged 16 to 65 not working in the agricultural sector. We 
exclude this sector owing to the special characteristics of self-employment in agriculture and the fact that 
agricultural employment in general has been noticeably decreasing since the 1960's. We also exclude 
those who declare not having had customers/clients during the last 12 months and unpaid family workers. 
We consider individuals from 25 European countries.4  
We select the subsample of self-employed workers. Out of 52,338 observations without missing 
values for any of the relevant variables, 3,533 (6.7%) correspond to dependent solo self-employed, 
defined as those self-employed without employees who worked during the last 12 months before the 
reference week of the survey for only one client and this client decides about her working hours. This 
definition is more restrictive than the one adopted by Eurostat (2018) for which economically dependent 
self-employed were defined as self-employed without employees who worked for only one client or for a 
dominant client. We analyse the robustness of our results to this less restrictive definition of the 
dependent self-employed for which we have 5,549 observations. As to the non-dependent self-employed, 
they encompass self-employed workers with more than one client, with or without employees. We 
disregard the observations corresponding to dependent self-employed with employees (only 345 in the 
total sample) to delve into the concept of dependency and the lack of occupational choice, but we also 
study the robustness of our results to the inclusion of this group of workers among the non-dependent 
self-employed. 
The explanatory variables used in the estimation can be classified into three groups: demographic and 
job-related characteristics, variables that capture the degree of occupational choice and job satisfaction, 
and macroeconomic variables related to country's wealth and the institutional framework. In the first 
group, we include gender, age, marital and immigrant status, education, occupation, activity, tenure, and 
part-time employment. Most of these are grouped into categories and are treated as dummies in the 
estimation. In the second group, we consider a dummy variable, SE_invol, which takes the value 1 if the 
individual is involuntary self-employed and 0 if she is voluntary, and a dummy variable, SE_invol_emp, 
which takes the value 1 if she is involuntary because the former employer requested it and 0 if she is 
either involuntary out of necessity or voluntary. Moreover, we include a variable that captures the degree 
of job satisfaction, and dummies for the desire to work more hours and for having autonomy in the job. 
Finally, in the third group as country level characteristics we include the log of the GDP per capita, the 
share of social security contributions paid by the employers, the rate of temporary employment, the share 
of the public sector, and the degree of centralization of the bargaining in the wage determination. In the 
Appendix, we report information about the definition of the variables. 
3.2. Descriptive evidence 
Figure 1 displays information about three indicators concerning self-employment by country: the 
share of self-employed over total employment (SE), the share of dependent self-employed (DSE) with 
and without employees over total self-employment, and the proportion of dependents who simultaneously 
are solo self-employed (DSSE).  
Cross-country differences in self-employment rates are substantial, ranging from a low of 5 percent 
in Norway to a high of 24 percent in Greece. Large differences are also observed in the proportion of 
dependent self-employment with a group of countries (Slovakia, Romania, Norway, Italy and the UK) 
clearly above the European average. Moreover, as previously pointed out, most of the dependent self-
employed do not have employees and the cross-country differences also hold in terms of this group. 
                                                             
4 Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Switzerland (CH), Czechia (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), 
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland, (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania 
(LT), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL) Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SL), Slovakia (SK), 
Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom (UK). Data from Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Estonia, Croatia, and Iceland 





Previous cross-country variations may be related to macroeconomic conditions and institutional 
differences. Figure A.1 in the Appendix plots the percentage of DSSE by country against some 
macroeconomic variables. It shows a tendency for the incidence of dependent solo self-employment to be 
lower in countries with higher GDP per capita and higher temporary employment rates and share of 
public sector. There is also a negative correlation with the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and 
a lack of correlation with the social security contributions paid by the employers. We will study whether 
or not these unconditional correlations still hold when we estimate a multivariate econometric model. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of different types of self-employed workers according to the 
involuntariness of the decision, job autonomy, and level of job-satisfaction. It shows that more than 32 
percent of the DSSE (33.6 percent in case of women)5 declare themselves to be involuntary, either 
because they could not find a job as an employee (24.7 percent) or because her former employer 
requested it (7.8 percent). These figures decrease to around 20 percent for dependent self-employed with 
employees and to 15 percent for non-dependent self-employed. Similar figures are found if we use 
another variable that captures to a certain extent the degree of involuntariness that is the proportion of 
self-employed workers who declare that they would prefer to work as a conventional employee. This 
descriptive evidence is in line with the hypothesis that it is likely that the dependent self-employed, 
particularly if they are solo, do not behave according to the traditional occupational choice model.  
Moreover, DSSE are the less satisfied with their job (the proportion of not satisfied workers is almost 
3 percentage points greater among the DSSE than among the non-dependent self-employed). They face 
constraints on how many hours they can work and a lack of autonomy, since around 11.6 percent (14 
percent of the women) declare that they would like to work more hours and more than 44 percent state 
that they do not have autonomy in the job. These figures decrease to around 16 percent and 18 percent for 
the non-dependent self-employed, with the differences across groups being statistically significant. 
Table 2 presents the main descriptive statistics in terms of worker and job characteristics. Whilst 
self-employed are predominantly male, the proportion of females is the lowest among dependent self-
employed with employees. The proportion of young, single and immigrant workers is higher among the 
DSSE than among the other groups of self-employed, as well as the proportion of low qualified white and 
blue-collar workers. We also find that mean tenure and mean number of hours worked are lower for the 
DSSE than for the other groups of self-employed. This evidence is in accordance with Muehlberger and 
Pasqua (2009) who find a high short-term persistency of DSE in Italy, and with Böheim and Muehlberger 
(2009) who get similar results for the United Kingdom, associating these jobs with more volatile labor 
market connections.  
 
4.  Empirical model 
To study the effect of macroeconomic and individual variables on the probability of being DSSE 
versus non-dependent self-employed we use discrete choice models. Let DSSEi be a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if the individual i is dependent solo self-employed and 0 if she is non-dependent self-
employed. The probability of interest can be expressed as a conditional expectation as follows: 
(1). Pr⁡(𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐸i = 1|Xi) = F(Xi´β)⁡⁡⁡⁡i = 1, … . N, 
where Xi is a vector of covariates and F denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function: 
(2). 𝐹(𝑧) = exp⁡(𝑧)
(1+exp(𝑧))
. 
As previously explained, our specification includes three types of covariates within the vector  Xi: (i) 
worker and job characteristics, (ii) variables that capture the degree of occupational choice and job 
satisfaction, and (iii) institutional and labor market characteristics defined at a country level. Some of the 
                                                             





variables are interacted with the degree of involuntariness so that we can check whether their effect on the 
likelihood of becoming DSSE is different depending on the reasons for becoming self-employed. 
The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML) for the whole sample and for men and women 
separately. We report two types of results. Firstly, we discuss the impact of the variables in terms of the 
sign and statistical significance of their estimated coefficients. Secondly, we report the average marginal 
effects (AME's) of the main variables of interest. These are the ultimate parameters of interest in this type 
of non-linear models. Given that our specification includes interactions between some of the explanatory 
variables and a set of dummy variables that capture the main reason for becoming self-employed, the 
marginal effect of these variables is different depending on the value of these dummies.   
To illustrate this point, let us consider for instance the AME of the log of the GDP per capita. Our 
specification includes the log of the GDP per capita and its interaction with the dummy for involuntary 
self-employment and the dummy for involuntary self-employment because the employer requested it. 
Specifically: 
(3). Pr⁡(𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐸i = 1|Xi) = F(β0 + β1SE_involi + β2SE_invol_empi + β3logGDPi+β4logGDPi ×
SE_involi + β5logGDPi × SE_invol_empi +Wi´δ), 
where Wi denotes the vector of the rest of covariates included in the model. Therefore, the AME of the 




∑ f(β0 + β3logGDPi +Wi´δ
N
i=1 ), 
where f denotes the logistic density function. Similarly, the AME of the log of GDP for involuntary self-
employed is obtained as: 
(5). ((β3 + β4) ×
1
N
∑ f(β0 + β1 + (β3 + β4)logGDPi +Wi´δ
N
i=1 )⁡, 
for those who are involuntary out of necessity, and 
(6). ((β3 + β4 + β5) ×
1
N
∑ f(β0 + β1 + β2 + (β3 + β4 + β5)logGDPi +Wi´δ
N
i=1 ), 
for those who are involuntary self-employed as requested by the employer. 
As to the AME of discrete variables, for instance the effect of involuntary versus voluntary self-
employed, it has been calculated as: 
(7). 1
N
∑ (F(β0 + β1 + β2SE_invol_empi + (β3+β4)logGDPi+β5logGDPi × SE_invol_empi +
N
i=1
Wi´δ) − F(β0 + β2SE_invol_empi + β3logGDPi+β5logGDPi × SE_invol_empi +Wi´δ)). 
 
5. Results 
The estimates for the probability of being DSSE versus non-dependent self-employed are reported in 
Table 3. In the first column, we present the estimates for the whole sample, and separate estimates for 
men and women are reported in the second and third column, respectively.6 The marginal effects of 
interest based on the corresponding logit estimations are reported in Table 4.  
The estimation results indicate that DSSE tend to be younger and less educated than the non-
dependent ones, although the effect of education becomes non-significant once we control by activity 
branch and occupation. They are also more likely to be immigrants and to work part time. We find that 
the probability of being dependent solo self-employed decreases with tenure. Therefore, it seems that the 
                                                             
6 The final specification includes only the interactions with the dummies for the reasons for becoming self-employed 




most vulnerable workers in terms of age, immigrant status, seniority and attachment to the labor market 
are more likely to be pushed into DSSE. 
Regarding the effect of the reasons for becoming self-employed, the estimates show a positive and 
significant coefficient for overall involuntary self-employed which is even stronger for those who are 
involuntary because the former employer requested it. In terms of the marginal effects, Table 4 shows that 
the probability of being a DSSE is 3.3 percentage points (pp) higher for the involuntary than for the 
voluntary self-employed. Moreover, this probability is 11.6 pp higher for those involuntary self-employed 
because the employer requested it than for the involuntary out of necessity. These results are even 
stronger for women. They point to a link between involuntariness and dependence and, in particular, to a 
lack of occupational choice for the dependent self-employed.  
We find that job satisfaction is negatively correlated with DSSE, although this effect is only 
significant for those self-employed who were forced to do so by the former employer and particularly 
strong for women: for those who declare being not-satisfied with her job the probability of being DSSE 
increases by 34 pp. The same type of negative correlation is found for the dummy that indicates whether 
the worker enjoys autonomy in the job: it decreases the probability of being DSSE by around 7 pp for the 
voluntary self-employed and by 13 pp for the involuntary ones. Another effect that indicates a lower 
degree of job satisfaction of the DSSE is the one given by the desire to work more hours: it decreases by 
around 3 pp the probability of being dependent solo self-employed among the involuntary self-employed 
workers.   
As to the impact of country-level variables, we find that in those countries where the GDP per capita 
is higher the probability of being DSSE decreases. Moreover, there is an increasing negative correlation 
according to the degree of occupational choice: the strongest negative effect is for the involuntary self-
employed forced to do so by the employer, while the weakest effect is for the voluntary self-employed. 
For instance, increasing the GDP per capita by 1% decreases the probability of being DSSE by 22 pp for 
those involuntary self-employed forced to do so by the employer and by 3 and 1 pp for the involuntary 
out of necessity and the voluntary self-employed, respectively. These effects are even stronger among 
women. These results again point to the fact that the DSSE are also particularly vulnerable in terms of the 
effect of economic conditions and that the degree of vulnerability significantly increases for those self-
employed with a lesser degree of occupational choice. 
Our results indicate that in those countries with a higher rate of temporary employment the 
probability of being DSSE decreases: when the temporary employment rate increases by 1 pp the 
probability of being DSSE decreases by 0.1 pp. This result points to a certain degree of substitutability 
between these two forms of precarious employment: as the flexibility for hiring through temporary 
employment increases, the incidence of dependent self-employed decreases. Similar results are found for 
the share of the public sector so that it seems that the expansion of the public sector crowds out private 
dependent solo self-employed: increasing the share of employment in the public sector by 1 pp decreases 
the probability of being DSSE by 0.3 pp among men and by 0.5 pp among women. 
Finally, those countries with a higher degree of centralization in wage bargaining show a higher 
incidence of DSSE, especially among the involuntary ones: increasing by 1 point the degree of 
centralization increases the probability of being DSSE by 0.7 and 0.4 pp for involuntary and voluntary 
self-employed men respectively. These figures increase to 3.8 and 0.8 pp respectively among women. 
Again, it seems that employers try to circumvent the strictness of the institutional setting by pushing for 
more DSSE. As to the effect of the social security contributions paid by the employers, we find opposite 
effects for men and women: increasing them by 1 pp decreases the incidence of male DSSE by 0.1 pp and 
increases the incidence of women DSSE by 0.2 pp.  
As a robustness check, we have performed similar estimations but using a less strict definition of the 
DSSE by also including among them those whose main source of income comes from one main client. 
The marginal effects of interest are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix. It can be seen that our main 




vulnerable than the non-dependent self-employed in terms of their personal characteristics, degree of 
occupational choice, job satisfaction and the effect of institutional and labor market conditions.  
Finally, we have estimated the models by including among the non-dependent self-employed those 
with only one client but with employees. Notice that this group was dropped from our previous samples. 
We do not include them among the dependent self-employed because they have employees, so they are 
different in nature from the traditional dependent self-employed. This increases the sample size by 345 
observations. The estimated AME's are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix and the results are in line 
with the previous ones. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We analyse the degree of involuntariness in the entrepreneurial activity of the dependent solo self-
employed and the effect of macroeconomic conditions and the institutional framework across countries. 
For that, we use microdata from the 2017 European Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS) ad-hoc module on 
self-employed persons and aggregated indicators to approximate a set of labor market institutions. 
Our principal findings can be summarized as follows: (1) DSSE exhibit a greater degree of 
involuntariness than the non-dependent self-employed. This effect is significantly higher for those who 
are involuntary self-employed because the employer requested it than for the involuntary out of necessity, 
and larger for women than for men. It points to a lack of occupational choice for the dependent self-
employed. (2) DSSE rates differ in a significant way across countries. In line with what the literature 
finds for overall self-employment (a decline in returns to entrepreneurship relative to wages as economies 
have more capital endowment measured by the GDP per capita), we also find that the richest countries 
have a lower incidence of DSSE. This negative impact of GDP is much stronger among involuntary self-
employed, and particularly among those who have been requested to do so by the former employer. 
Moreover, at sample magnitudes the effect of GDP per capital is significantly larger than that of the labor 
market institutions. (3) DSSE rates are negatively affected by alternative measures of labor market 
flexibility, such as the temporary employment rate or the degree of centralization in the wage bargaining. 
In particular, we find evidence of a certain degree of substitution between two forms of precarious 
employment: temporary workers and DSSE. Again, strict labor market regulations tend to increase the 
incidence of this type of vulnerable employment, particularly for the involuntary self-employed workers. 
(4) There is evidence of some crowding-out of the DSSE due to the expansion of the employment in the 
public sector. 
Our results are useful for understanding the nature of the DSSE (mainly involuntary) and to account 
for the potential externalities that labor market institutions and economic conditions might have on the 
incidence of this type of employment. The trend to increase labor market flexibility observed in many 
countries would have important consequences on the evolution of the DSSE. Given that the incidence of 
this type of employment is higher among involuntary workers, especially those forced to do so by the 
previous employer, points to the need for a higher degree of protection for them. 
Finally, the 2017 EU-LFS ad-hoc module on self-employed persons used in this paper makes it 
possible to account for the reasons why individuals enter into self-employment and to use a clear 
definition of the DSSE. Nonetheless, its main shortcoming is that given the cross-sectional nature of the 
data, we are not able to analyse the dynamics of the DSSE activity. This prevents us from studying issues 
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Table 1. Involuntariness, job satisfaction and autonomy, EULFS 2017 






Proportion of Involuntary SE: 17.0 15.7 21.8 32.5 0.0000 
       that could not find a job as employee 14.9 14.0 18.0 24.7 0.0000 
       as requested by former employer   2.1 1.6 3.8 7.8 0.0000 
Proportion of SE that wish to work as employee 17.6 15.7 20.8 31.9 0.0000 
Proportion of SE without total autonomy   18.6 16.4 24.2 44.3 0.0000 
Proportion of SE that wish to work more hours 8.4 8.1 7.9 11.6 0.0000 
Proportion of SE not satisfied 7.5 7.2 9.6 10.1 0.0000 
No observations 52,338 48,460 345 3,533 0.0000 
























Table 2. Sample means of main variables, EULFS 2017 
  All SE 
Non-DSE 
 









Male 66.7 66.9 74.9 63.2 0.0000 
Age 16-29 8.4 7.7 6.8 17.2 0.0000 
Age 30-49 53.6 53.8 48.3 51.8 0.0041 
Age 50-64 38.0 38.5 44.8 31.1 0.0000 
Married 62.1 62.7 63.7 54.1 0.0000 
Immigrant 7.9 7.6 10.5 10.9 0.0000 
Primary education 17.9 18.1 15.7 15.6 0.0096 
Secondary education 43.0 42.8 38.2 45.9 0.0002 
University education 39.1 39.1 46.1 38.5 0.1848 
High white collar 37.4 37.6 55.6 32.8 0.0000 
Low white collar  15.3 14.6 14.1 23.2 0.0000 
High blue collar 44.2 45.0 28.6 36.8 0.0000 
Low blue collar 3.1 2.7 1.6 7.2 0.0000 
Manufacturing 8.1 8.1 8.1 7.5 0.1769 
Construction 15.8 15.8 18.8 16.2 0.0308 
Transportation 32.6 33.2 26.5 25.7 0.0000 
Financial 3.5 3.3 6.4 5.5 0.0000 
Professional 18.7 18.8 14.0 18.4 0.1050 
Education and Health 11.1 10.6 22.7 14.8 0.0000 
Households 0.5 0.2 0.3 4.0 0.0000 
Other services 9.7 10.1 3.1 6.8 0.0000 
Part-time employment 15.1 14.1 20.4 26.8 0.0000 
Mean tenure 11.9 12.3 12.2 7.8 0.0000 
Mean hours 41.2 41.7 41.6 35.8 0.0000 
No observations 52,338 48,460 345 3,533  





















Table 3. Estimates for the probability of DSSE (only 1 client) versus non-dependent SE 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 VARIABLES All Men Women 
Individual characteristics    
Men 0.037   
Age 30-49 -0.358*** -0.355*** -0.339*** 
Age 50-64 -0.183*** -0.236*** -0.043 
Married -0.136*** -0.190*** -0.039 
Immigrant 0.226*** 0.203** 0.326*** 
Secondary education -0.007 -0.005 -0.068 
University education -0.085 -0.024 -0.237** 
Part-time employment 0.487*** 0.399*** 0.704*** 
Tenure -0.040*** -0.036*** -0.046*** 
Degree of choice and satisfaction    
SE invol. 2.442*** 1.566 4.739*** 
SE invol. empl. 14.52*** 14.99*** 15.65*** 
Autonomy -1.092*** -1.139*** -1.007*** 
Autonomy*SE invol. -0.221*** -0.231** -0.235* 
Wish to work more hours 0.068 0.134 -0.006 
Wish to work more*SE invol. -0.564*** -0.639*** -0.413** 
Job satisfaction -0.025 -0.041 0.023 
Job satisf. *SE invol. empl. -0.545** -0.231 -2.050*** 
Macroeconomic variables    
Log GDP per capita -0.228*** -0.115* -0.512*** 
LGDP* SE invol. -0.195** -0.094 -0.459*** 
LGDP* SE invol. empl. -1.286*** -1.357*** -1.253*** 
Centralized wage bargaining 0.103*** 0.084** 0.144*** 
Centrl. barg. * SE invol. 0.129** 0.023 0.334*** 
Social sec. contrib. 0.002 -0.014** 0.030*** 
Share public sector -0.063*** -0.054*** -0.079*** 
Temporary empl. rate -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.021*** 
Constant 2.396*** 1.608** 4.650*** 
 No Observations 51,993 33,977 18,016 
    The models include occupation and sector of activity. *, **, ***, denote significance at 10, 5 and 














Table 4. Average marginal effects. DSSE (only 1 client) versus non-dependent SE 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 VARIABLES All Men Women 
Degree of choice and satisfaction    













      for SE vol. -0.072*** 
 
-0.073*** -0.069*** 
   for SE invol. -0.130*** 
 
-0.127*** -0.127*** 
Wish to work more hours: 
      for SE vol. 0.003 
 
0.007 -0.0003 


















Macroeconomic variables    
Log GDP per capita: 


















Centralized wage bargaining 










Social sec. contrib. 0.0001 -0.001*** 0.002*** 
Share public sector -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 
Temporary empl. rate -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 No Observations 51,993 33,977 18,016 


















Individual variables  
Self-employed. The variable takes the value 1 for those individuals who identify themselves as self-
employed as their main activity (with or without employees). 
Dependent solo self-employed. The variable takes the value 1 for the self-employed with only one client 
and without employees and 0 for the self-employed with more than one client. 
Involuntary Self-employed. The variable takes the value 1 for the self-employed who either could not find 
a job as an employee or were requested to do so by a former employer and 0 for voluntary self-employed.  
Gender. The variable takes the value 1 for males and 0 for females. 
Education. Grouped into three categories: Primary education, Secondary education and University 
education. 
Age. Grouped into three categories: 16-29, 30-49, and 50-64. 
Marital status. The variable takes the value 1 for married individuals and 0 otherwise. 
Immigrant status. The variable takes the value 1 for immigrants and 0 for natives.  
Part time employment. The variable takes the value 1 for part-time and 0 for full-time workers. 
Sector of activity. We consider the following categories: Manufacturing, Construction, Wholesale, 
Transportation and Accommodation, Financial and Real State, Professional and administrative services, 
Education and Health, Households as employers, and other services. 
Occupation. We consider the following categories: High white collar (managers and professionals), Low 
white collar (technicians), High blue collar (craftsmen and skilled workers), and Low blue collar 
(elementary occupations). 
Tenure. Defined as the number of years working as self-employed.  
Job satisfaction. The variable takes the value 1 for highly satisfied or satisfied workers and 0 for low or 
very low satisfied workers. 
Autonomy. The variable takes the value 1 for workers able to influence both in contents and order of job 
tasks and 0 otherwise. 
Wish to work more hours. The variable takes the value 1 for workers willing to work more hours and 0 
otherwise. 
National economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product per capita.  Source: EUROSTAT 2017. 





Share of public employment sector: Government employment over total employment. Source: 2017, 
EUROSTAT. 
Employers’ social security contributions: Measured as a percentage of total labor costs. Source: Labor 
Cost Survey, 2016, EUROSTAT. 
Centralization of the wage bargaining: Continuous variable that accounts for the dominant level of 
bargaining (ranging from 1 -lower centralization- to 5 -higher centralization), and the incidence of and 
control over additional bargaining at enterprise level; the ‘space’ that central or sectoral agreements 
assign, delegate or allow for such additional bargaining to take place; and the degree to which agreements 
can be perforated through the use of ‘opening clauses’.  Source: the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies (AIAS) database (Visser, 2019). 
 










Table A1. Involuntariness, job satisfaction and autonomy by gender, EULFS 2017 
  Men Women 
  All SE DSE with employees DSSE All SE 
DSE with 
employees DSSE 
Proportion of Involuntary 
SE: 16.7 19.8 31.9 17.5 28.1 33.6 
       that could not find a 
job as employee 14.5 15.9 23.1 15.7 24.5 27.6 
        requested by former     
employer   
2.3 3.9 8.8 1.8 3.6 6.0 
Proportion of SE that wish 
to work as employee 16,5 14.7 29.1 19.7 37.5 36.7 
Proportion of SE without 
total autonomy   18.5 27.6 45.4 18.7 14.2 42.5 
Proportion of SE that wish 
to work more hours 7.5 5.4 10.1 10.2 15.4 14.1 
Proportion of SE not 
satisfied 7.6 8.2 10.6 7.2 14 9.3 
No Observations 34,243  266 2,094   18,095 79  1,439  



























Variables (%) All SE DSE with employees DSSE All SE 
DSE with 
employees DSSE  
Age 16-29 8.2 5.8 17.9 8.8 9.8 15.9  
Age 30-49 52.9 47.6 51.7 55.2 50.6 51.8  
Age 50-64 39.0 46.6 30.4 36.0 39.6 32.3  
Married 63.2 66.1 53.3 59.9 56.6 55.6  
Immigrant 8.1 7.1 11.9 7.5 20.7 9.2  
Primary education 20.3 18.1 17.8 13.0 8.4 11.7  
Secondary education 45.1 41.5 49.1 38.9 28.5 40.5  
University education 34.6 40.4 33.1 48.1 63.1 47.8  
White collar high 35.0 49.2 29.1 42.3 74.9 38.9  
White collar low 14.3 15.4 22.3 17.2 10.3 24.9  
Blue collar high 47.7 33.7 40.9 37.4 13.5 29.9  
Blue collar low 3.0 1.7 7.6 3.1 1.3 6.5  
Manufacturing 9.7 9.4 9.3 4.9 4.5 4.5  
Construction 22.8 23.2 25.1 1.9 5.9 1.0  
Transportation 34.4 27.6 31.3 29.1 23.1 16.0  
Financial 3.5 7.2 5.6 3.4 4.0 5.4  
Professional 17.7 15.6 15.0 20.7 9.3 24.2  
Education and Health 6.0 13.9 8.2 21.3 48.8 29.1  
Households 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.2 1.2 9.4  
Other services 5.8 3.1 4.7 17.5 3.2 10.4  
Part-time employment 8.6 13.2 16.0 28.2 41.9 45.3  
Mean tenure 12.7 12.9 8.5 10.4 10,8 6.7  
Mean hours 43.8 44.1 39.1 36.1 36.6 30.2  














Table A3. Average marginal effects. DSSE (only 1 client or 1 main client) versus non-dependent SE 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 VARIABLES All Men Women 
Degree of choice and satisfaction    
SE invol. vs SE vol. .045*** .039*** .052*** 
SE invol. empl. vs SE invol.nec. .129*** .128*** .144*** 
Autonomy: 
      for SE vol. -.090*** -.093*** -.084*** 
   for SE invol. -.174*** -.166*** -.177*** 
Wish to work more hours: 
      for SE vol. .029*** .036*** .019*** 
   for SE invol. -.039*** -.046*** -.024** 
Job satisfaction: 
      for SE invol. nec. -.007 -.009 -.002 
   for SE invol. empl. -.084** -.052 -.281***   
Macroeconomic variables    
Log GDP per capita: 
    for SE invol. empl. -.227*** -.219*** -.242*** 
 for SE invol. nec. -.022*** -.007 -.060*** 
 for SE vol. .002 .009*** -.015*** 
Centralized wage bargaining 
      for SE invol. .021*** .008 .045*** 
   for SE vol. .009*** .008*** . 012*** 
Social sec. contrib. -.001*** -.002*** -.0002 
Share public sector -.0005 .0004 -.002*** 
Temporary empl. rate -.002*** -.001*** -.002*** 
 No Observations 51,993 33,977 18,016 

















Table A4. Average marginal effects. DSSE (only 1 client) versus non-dependent SE including SE 
with 1 client and employees 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 VARIABLES All Men Women 
Degree of choice and satisfaction    
SE invol. vs SE vol. .032*** .026*** .039*** 
SE invol. empl. vs SE invol.nec. .115*** .113*** .128*** 
Autonomy: 
      for SE vol. -.071*** -.072*** -.069*** 
   for SE invol. -.128*** -.125*** -.126*** 
Wish to work more hours: 
      for SE vol. .004 .007 .0001  
   for SE invol. -.032*** -.029*** -.032*** 
Job satisfaction: 
      for SE invol. nec. -.002   -.0023 .001  
   for SE invol. empl. -.087*** -.040 -.348*** 
Macroeconomic variables    
Log GDP per capita: 
    for SE invol. empl. -.219*** -.192*** -.288*** 
 for SE invol. nec.   -.031*** -.014*** -.077*** 
 for SE vol. -.011*** -.005**   -.028*** 
Centralized wage bargaining 
      for SE invol. .017*** .007** .038*** 
   for SE vol. .005*** .004*** .008*** 
Social sec. contrib. .0001  -.0007*** .002*** 
Share public sector -.003*** -.003*** -.005*** 
Temporary empl. rate -.001*** -.001*** -.001*** 
 No  Observations 52,338 34,243 18,095 
*, **, ***, denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
